We extend the theoretical basis of the empirical literature on the effects of R&D subsidies by providing an estimable model of strategic interaction among subsidy applicants, and public and private sector R&D financiers. Our model incorporates fixed R&D costs and a cost of external finance. We derive the optimal support rule. At the intensive (extensive) margin the costs of external funding reduce (increase) the optimal subsidy rate. We also establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of additionality. It turns out that additionality at the intensive margin is less likely with large spillovers. Our results suggest that the relationship between additionality and welfare may not be straightforward.
Introduction
It is widely acknowledged that private sector investments in innovation are crucial for the enhancement of economic growth and welfare. Nevertheless, the private sector is likely to invest sub-optimally in R&D because of appropriability problems and potential market failures in the provision of private funding to R&D. To stimulate private R&D investments, governments around the world are increasingly spending public funds in direct R&D subsidies and tax incentives. These innovation polices have a central role in virtually all developed countries.
1 For example, all OECD countries use direct R&D subsidies, and increasingly many oer some form of R&D tax incentive (Warda 2006 , OECD 2011 , and Busom, Corchuelo and Martinez Ros 2012 . Both innovation support policies are also becoming more widespread in emerging countries: e.g., India uses both subsidies and tax credits.
A large empirical literature has contributed to our understanding of how these policies work: the R&D subsidy literature is surveyed, e.g., by David, Hall and Toole (2000) , Garcia-Quevedo (2004) , Cerulli (2010) , and Zúñica- Vicente et al. (2012) , and the R&D tax credit literature by Hall and van Reenen (2000) , Parsons and Phillips (2007) and Mohnen and Lokshin (2010) .
The research eort has largely focused on the question of whether or not there is additionality, i.e, whether public support increases private R&D investment rather than crowds it out.
While the basic theoretical motivation for government support to private 1 In this paper innovation or R&D support policies refer to R&D subsidies and tax incentives, although the set of innovation policies include a variety of other instruments such as intellectual property rights and prizes. See Takalo (2012) for a review of the instruments for innovation policy and their justications.
R&D has been well understood for at least half a century (Nelson 1959, and Arrow 1962) , the empirical literature is generally not based on theoretical models capturing the strategic decisions by rms, government agencies, and private sector nanciers of R&D that constitute an essential part of an innovation policy environment. Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2011) model the rm's decision to apply for a subsidy, the government's decision on the level of support, and the rm's subsequent R&D investment. In this paper, we extend that model to include xed costs of R&D projects, and a possibility to tap nancial markets for R&D funding at a cost. We produce new results concerning the sources and implications of additionality. These extensions and results provide new insights into both the role of dierent market failures in innovation policy design and the existing results in the literature, and should be helpful in new empirical investigations on innovation policies.
A generic form of the equation typically estimated in the literature is g(R) = Xβ + f (s)δ + (1) where the outcome variable g(R) is often either directly the R&D investment (R) or its logarithm (ln R), X is a vector of control variables with β being the associated vector of coecients, f (s) is a function of the public funding of R&D (which comes either in the form of direct subsidies or tax incentives) and s is the support (subsidy, tax credit) rate, i.e., the fraction of R&D paid from public funds, and is a stochastic error term.
4 In this paper we introduce a competitive nancial sector funding R&D into the model of Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2011) . This is a simple way to model the costs of (private sector) external funding of R&D. We also add xed costs of R&D, which determine the eects of R&D 3 For example, in the Spanish data used by Busom, Corchuelo and Martinez Ros (2012) , only 12% of SMEs and 20% of large rms investing in R&D use both subsidies and tax credits. 23% of SMEs and 17% of large rms invest with the help of subsidies only, and 17% of SMEs and 26% of large rms only use tax credits. The rest invest without neither form of support . 4 Gelabert, Fosfuri and Tribó (2009) and Busom, Corchuelo and Martinez Ros (2012) study the interaction empirically, and Keuschnigg and Ribi (2010) and theoretically but to the best of our knowledge there exists no structural econometric model besides our ongoing work (Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen 2010 ) that would incorporate both private and public sources of R&D funding. support policies at the extensive margin where the rms decide whether or not to invest in R&D. It is widely thought that policies generate larger additionality at the extensive margin than at the intensive margin where rms conducting R&D decide how much they invest (see, e.g., Einiö 2009 ). We also use a more general form for the rm's prot function which allows an analysis of the eects of the rm's production technology.
We characterize the optimal subsidy policy in the presence of both xed costs and external funding costs. We nd that an increase in the xed cost of R&D or in external nancing cost may lead to lower or higher subsidies depending on parameter values. The government needs to give a higher subsidy to get the project implemented when xed costs increase. An increase in the cost of external nance further raises the required subsidy at the extensive margin, conditional on one being granted. But the costs eventually become so high that it is better not to subsidize the project even if the project is then not executed. In addition, we nd that an increase in the cost of external nance leads to a reduction in the optimal subsidy rate at the intensive margin as a higher cost of nance dampens the rm's response to the subsidy.
We also establish necessary and sucient conditions for the existence of additionality and for additionality to lead to a welfare improvement. It turns out that the projects generating large spillovers which optimally receive large subsidies are less likely to generate additionality at the intensive margin. The existence of additionality is neither a necessary nor a sucient condition for welfare improving subsidies.
We present the model in the next section. In Section 3, we solve the 5 model and characterize equilibria. In Sections 2 and 3 we also show how to derive estimation equations from our model, some of which are familiar from the existing literature. This econometric model is summarized in Section 4. In Section 5 we briey discuss the implications of our model for the rationales of R&D support policies, additionality, its relation to welfare, and the interpretation of additionality results of the empirical literature. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider a four-stage game of incomplete information among a rm with an R&D project, a public agency that gives R&D subsidies, and private sector nanciers oering funding for R&D. Henceforth we refer to the public agency simply as the agency and to the private sector nanciers as nanciers when no confusion may arise. The R&D project involves both a variable investment and a xed cost. For brevity, we assume the rm has no funds of its own and one project per rm.
Timing of events. In stage one, the rm decides whether or not to apply for a subsidy for an R&D project. If the rm applies, in stage two the agency evaluates the proposed project, and decides the level of the subsidy, which amounts to a credible promise to reimburse ex post a share of the variable R&D investment costs. In stage three, nanciers compete to supply the rest of the needed project funding. In stage four the rm decides the level of its R&D investment. If the rm invests, and has been granted a subsidy 6 in stage two, it will be reimbursed accordingly. Finally, the project returns are realized, and divided according to the nancing contract made in stage three.
Assumptions. Our goal is to build a model that not only delivers theoretical insights but that can also be estimated. We therefore use more specic functional forms than would be necessary from a purely theoretical point of view. Assumptions on functional forms are introduced as we proceed.
We make two key informational assumptions. First, the type of a rm is common knowledge. This avoids complexities arising from signaling games.
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Second, the type of the public agency is unknown to the rm when it contemplates the subsidy application. The rm only knows the distribution of the agency type. As will be made more precise in Section 2.4, the agency's type is about how it values the project of the rm beyond the prots the project generates. It may be helpful to think of these benets as spillovers.
The latter informational assumption in essence introduces uncertainty on the rm's side about the agency's valuation of its projects when contemplating an application. This ensures, in line with empirical evidence, equilibrium outcomes where a rm submits a costly subsidy application only to be turned down. Since in our model the agency cannot signal its type to a potential applicant, it is immaterial whether the type of the agency is private information or whether there is symmetric but incomplete information. We opt for the simpler and arguably more realistic assumption that the agency learns its type after receiving and screening an application, i.e., symmetric but in-5 See for a model where a subsidy decision by the agency acts as a signal about the rm's type for nanciers. complete information regarding the agency's type prevails at the application stage.
Compared to standard corporate nance models, where often a borrower's type is private information and hence unknown to a (private sector) lender, these two informational assumptions may sound unorthodox. However, the theoretical literature on public funding of private R&D is scant. To us, it is quite reasonable to think that a rm, when contemplating an application, does not exactly know the agency's objective function or how the agency values the rm's project. There is less ambiguity concerning the objective function of private sector nanciers since they may be assumed to maximize prots.
These two informational assumptions have an important implication: the rm's type cannot be correlated with the agency type, as otherwise the rm could infer information about the agency type from the type of its own project. In the empirical implementation of the model, this means that the shock to spillovers generated by the rm's R&D (agency's type), internalized by the agency but not the rm nor its nancier, is not correlated with the shock that aects the private protability of R&D (rm's type). This assumption does not remove the endogeneity problem emphasized in the literature, since the subsidy amount (measured in monetary units) is still a function of the shock to the project's private protability even if the subsidy rate (measured as a per cent of the rm's R&D expense) is not.
As is standard, we also assume that the rm's investment is non-veriable to third parties and that hence neither the agency's nor nanciers' funding decisions can be written contingent on the rm's investment.
We further make a number of (common-knowledge) assumptions concerning the behavior of the agency. In line with the practice of subsidy programs, the subsidy level is subject both to a maximum constraint that is strictly less than unity, and to a minimum constraint of zero, which binds if there is no application or the application is rejected. For simplicity we assume that the agency's budget constraint does not bind. We do however impose a cost of nance on the agency, and show that the agency will reject applications. We also assume that public funding cannot be extended towards xed costs nor external nancing costs. In practice, variable costs are easier to allocate to a given project than xed costs, and therefore more likely to be accepted by the agency. For example, the Finnish agency granting R&D subsidies (Tekes) has rules on eligible expenses and regularly does not accept all types of costs included by applications. In particular, the costs of raising external nance are non-eligible.
We focus on perfect Bayesian equilibria as will specied in Section 3.
R&D technology
A rm needs to incur both a variable cost R≥ 1 and a xed cost F ≥ 0 to undertake an innovation project (unless otherwise indicated all variables are project specic). Conditional on investing both R and F , the rm's expected discounted prots, gross of variable and xed costs of R&D, and possible costs of applying for a subsidy, are given by
where α ≥ 0. As can be seen from equation (2) 6 It is plausible to think that rms and projects dier both in the quality and the concavity of project returns.
To keep our model well behaved we impose the following restriction on γ:
Here g > 1 is the shadow cost of public funds, placing an upper-bound on the concavity of the prot function. For example, if g = 1.2, Assumption 1 implies that γ ∈ (−5, 1).
Financial markets
Since the rm has no liquid funds of its own and since the public agency (at maximum) subsidizes a fraction of the investment ex post, the rm must raise funding from nancial markets for the R&D investment. A nancing contract between the rm and its nancier stipulates that the returns from the project are split according to
where π B and π E denote the nancier's and the rm's share of project returns (superscripts B and E stand for a "bank" and an entrepreneur). In our setting this return sharing rule accommodates both equity and debt contracts.
The nanciers in this model are passive, arm's length nanciers rather than active early-stage investors.
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The market rate of return (the opportunity cost of nanciers' funds) is ρ 1. Following the corporate nance literature, we assume competitive nancial markets with free entry of identical nanciers with unlimited supply of funds. As a result, we can look for a nancing contract that maximizes the rm's payo subject to a nancier's zero prot condition. Since external nance is costly (ρ 1) , the rm wants to minimize the amount of funds raised from the market. The rm thus asks the nancier to provide the part of the project funding that is not covered by the public agency. Since subsidies are paid ex post, the nancier must rst fund the whole investment R + F but then gets the subsidy, if any, granted to the rm by the agency. Thus the rm oers a contract that satises the nancier's zero prot condition
where s ∈ [0, s], s < 1, is the subsidy rate provided by the agency. The nancier's share of project returns is then
Equation (5) fully characterizes the terms under which a competitive nancier is willing to fund the rm's R&D investment.
R&D investment
Since the rm raises all the funds for the investment from outside investors, the rm's prots can be obtained from equation (3) as π
After substitution of equations (2) and (5) for π and π B this can be rewritten as
where ρ − s captures the marginal cost of R&D, which is strictly positive given that ρ 1 and s ≤ s < 1. Since the rm's objective function (6) is concave in R, the rst-order condition
gives the rm's optimal variable investment R * * (s), conditional on investing, as a strictly increasing function of the subsidy rate.
Dening α := exp(Xβ + ) and taking the natural log of both sides of equation (7) yields
Clearly, this is identical to the generic R&D equation (1) where g(R) = ln R * * (s), f (s) = ln(ρ − s) and δ = 1/(γ − 1). When estimating (8), one should note that equation (8) is dened at the project level (γ and ρ may be assumed to be the same for all projects of a rm). As project level R&D is typically only observed for rms receiving subsidies, one has to take care of the selection into that group.
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The prots generated by the optimal investment given by equation (7) need to be large enough to ensure that the rm's participation constraint is satised, i.e., π E (R * * (s), s) ≥ 0 must hold. Otherwise, the rm does not invest. By substituting equation (7) for (6) we can rewrite π
In what follows we call equation (9) the rm's investment constraint.
We may now write the rm's optimal investment decision as
where 1 π E (R * * (s), s) ≥ 0 is an indicator function taking value one if equation (9) holds and zero otherwise, and where R * * (s) is given by equation (7). An inspection of equations (8) and (9) reveals that equation (9) yields a discrete choice estimation equation where the error term ( ) enters nonadditively and non-separably. The investment constraint hence needs to be estimated using a simulation estimator.
Public funding
The agency's utility (e.g. social welfare) from the applicant's project is given
where g > 1 is, as mentioned, the constant opportunity cost of the public funds. As the second and third term on the right-hand side of equation (11) show, the rm's and nancier's prots enter the agency's objective function. The rst term on the right-hand side gives the agency specic returns from the project. That is, v captures the eects of the rm's R&D on the agency beyond the rm's and nancier's payos and beyond the direct costs of subsidy. For example, v can include standard welfare externalities of R&D investments such as consumer surplus or technological spillovers, but it can also include private benets from funding the project to the agency's civil servants. Note that v can also be negative, e.g., due to duplication of R&D costs, business stealing eects, or negative environmental externalities of the project. In what follows, we will call v the spillover rate.
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As equation (11) shows the spillover rate v is assumed to be linear in the investment level R. This greatly facilitates the empirical implementation of 9 Naturally, parts of v may be systematic across rms. For example, Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen (2011) nd that a one grade increase in the evaluated level of technical challenger of a project increases the subsidy rate in Finland by ten percentage points. 
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The spillover rate v ∈ V also captures the type of the agency, with V being some nite type space. The agency type is drawn from a common knowledge distribution with probability density function φ(v) and cumulative density function Φ(v). As mentioned, v is known to the agency when it makes the subsidy decision but is unknown to the rm when it contemplates applying for subsidies. In words, the potential applicant is uncertain about how the agency, after screening the project proposal, sees the project and its potential to generate spillovers, consumer surplus, or other (positive or negative) externalities.
Since equation (4) 
subject to equations (7), (9), and to the agency's participation constraint
Equation (13) implies that the agency's benets from the applicant's project should be non-negative when it grants an optimal positive subsidy rate (s * > 0); otherwise we assume that the agency does not grant a positive subsidy (s * = 0 ).
To characterize the optimal agency decisions, let us rst ignore the rm's 10 This assumption allows the existence of a steady state in endogenous growth models.
15 investment constraint (9), the agency's participation constraint (13), and the maximum and minimum constraints for s. By using the envelope theorem, and equations (6) and (7), the rst-order condition for the agency's unconstrained problem can be written as
If the rm's investment constraint (9) binds but the agency's participation constraint (13) does not bind, the optimal subsidy rate is given by
Depending on parameter values, the agency's optimal subsidy decision s * is 0,ŝ, s * * ors. It is useful to characterize parameters in two dimensions, F and v. In particular, from equation (15) we see that if
then the rms' investment constraint (9) never binds and, by implication, s ≤ 0, i.e., xed costs are so small that they aect neither the agency's nor the rm's decisions. In contrast, if
xed costs are so high that the rm will not invest even with a maximum subsidy rates. If F ∈ F ,F , the rm will invest only if it receives a subsidy, and grantingŝ becomes an option to the agency.
In empirical implementation, one could dene v := Zλ + η where Z is a vector of control variables (such as rm and project characteristics, and may dier from X), λ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and η a random shock to the spillover. Then, equation (14) immediately yields an (two-limit Tobit) estimation equation that allows the identication of the parameters of the agency's utility function if condition (16) holds (see Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen 2011, for details for the case ρ = 1 and γ = 0).
Although the general case where condition (16) does not necessarily hold is more complicated, equation (14) still forms the basis for the estimation of the parameters of the agency utility function.
Firm's application decision
In stage one of the game, the rm has to decide whether or not to apply for a subsidy. If the rm does not apply, its discounted prots are
where the subscript N indicates that the rm does not apply for a subsidy.
The right-hand side of equation (18) shows how the rm has an option to invest in R&D even without a subsidy. To value this option to invest, the rm must calculate its prots in case it invests without a subsidy. Naturally the investment is made only if the rm's investment constraint (9) holds for s = 0.
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The rm's expected discounted prots in case it applies for a subsidy are given by
where K > 0 is the cost of applying for subsidies, E v π E (R (s * ) , s * ) are the expected gross prots conditional on applying and investing in R&D, and subscript A indicates that the rm applies for a subsidy. That is, the rm, when contemplating an application, must take expectation over all possible types of the agency, and then calculate all possible subsidy rates resulting from those agency types. Then the rm can calculate the expected costs of private sector external nancing and its expected investment levels resulting from those subsidy rates, and, ultimately, its expected discounted prots resulting from those investments and subsidy rates. The rst term on the right-hand side of equation (19) gives the value of the option to invest with a non-negative subsidy rate. The right-hand side as a whole in turn gives the expected value of applying for a subsidy.
The rm then applies for a subsidy only if the application constraint
holds. The rm's optimal application decision can then be expressed as an
The exact form of the application constraint (20) depends on the size of xed costs. If condition (16) holds, the rm will launch the project even without a subsidy. Since the optimal unconstrained subsidy rate (equation (14)) is an increasing function of the spillover rate, the rm can calculate that the minimum constraint of zero on the subsidy rate binds for suciently low spillover rates: v ≤ v := ρ (g − 1) (1 − γ). Similarly, the maximum constraint of s binds for high enough spillover rates v ≥ v :
For v ∈ (v, v, ) , the subsidy rate is s * * .
the application constraint (20) can be written aŝ
and the rm's optimal application decision as d
that takes value one if condition (21) holds and zero otherwise.
If F ∈ F ,F , the rm will not launch the project without a subsidy (equation (18) becomes Π E N = 0). From equations (14) and (15) the rm can observe that for suciently high spillover rates,
] , the investment constraint remains irrelevant for the decision making of the agency. If v < v, the rm knows that either it will receive a zero subsidy in which case it will not invest or it will receive subsidy s that just satises the rm's investment constraint, which by denition also leads to the zero prots. As clearly v < v <v, the application constraint
and the rm's optimal application decision is d
that takes value one if condition (22) holds and zero otherwise.
In contrast, if condition (17) holds, the rm will not invest even if it received the maximum subsidy rates. Therefore Π E A − Π E N = −K, and the rm will not apply for a subsidy, i.e., d
In empirical implementation, one could specify K := exp(Yθ + σ) where Y is a vector of control variables (and may partially dier from X and Z), θ is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and σ is a random shock to the application costs. The application constraint (21) can then be simplied by using equations (6) and (8) and some algebra (for example taking logs of both sides) to
As explained in Takalo where the second stage is the rm's R&D equation (8), allowing for the identication of the estimated application cost parameters θ. A similar albeit more complicated procedure can be used to recover the application cost parameters in the general case where condition (16) does not necessarily hold.
3 Equilibria
We complete the model by characterizing perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE).
In our model the rm's and nanciers' posterior beliefs concerning the agency's type v ∈V after observing a subsidy decision are inconsequential, so there is no need to model the updating of beliefs.
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A strategy for the rm prescribes i) an application decision in stage one as a function of the expected payo to applying d : R → {0, 1} where 1 and 0 denote the apply and do-not-apply decisions, respectively, and ii)
an R&D investment decision in stage four for each application, subsidy, and funding decision made in earlier stages, R :
A strategy for the agency maps its type and the rm's application decision into a subsidy rate, s :
A strategy for a nancier maps the rm's application decision and the agency's subsidy rate into terms of
A PBE in our model satises the following four standard criteria: 1) the rm's prior belief about the agency's type describes a rational assessment of how the agency values the rm's project. Such a rational prior belief is fully depicted by φ(v) and Φ(v); 2) the rm's strategy is d
and R * (s) as given by equation (10); 3) the nancier earns zero prots, i.e., π B * (s) is given by equation (5); and 4) if d * = 1, the agency's strategy is s * (v) = {0,ŝ,s * * ,s} where s * * andŝ are given by equations (14) and (15), respectively, and if d * = 0, s * (v) = 0 for all v.
11 Such updating would be an essential feature of a dynamic model where the rm or nanciers would learn something about the agency's type when making sequential applications over time. This constitute an interesting but challenging topic for further research.
Furthermore, as mentioned in Section 2, we assume that whenever the agency rejects an application, it grants no subsidy. More formally, we impose an additional criterion on the agency's strategy: 5) for those v that make a rejection of an application optimal for the agency, s * (v) = 0. 
and R * (0) = 0.
12 In theory, any s ∈ [0,ŝ) amounts to a rejection of an application, and the agency is indierent among s ∈ [0,ŝ) whenever it nds it optimal to reject an application. Hence, without this additional restriction on the agency strategy, there would be a continuum of optimal agency decisions for such v that make a rejection optimal. Our understanding is that in practice, an agency grants a zero subsidy for applications it wants to reject. Note also that s * (v) = 0 for all v if d * = 0 comes from the practice; as mentioned, the agency cannot grant a positive subsidy rate unless it receives an application. 
The Econometric Model
Let us briey summarize the econometric model suggested by the theoretical model in Section 2 (for more details we refer the reader to Toivanen 2010, 2011) . As shown, our theoretical model yields three main estimation equations, dened at the project level: the rm's R&D and application equations (8) and (23), and the agency's subsidy equation (14) (with v := Zλ + η ). The primitives of this econometric model are 1) the parameters of the rm's prot function (β, γ, F ), 2) the parameters of the agency's utility function (λ, g), 3) the parameters of the nanciers' payo function (ρ), 4) the parameters of the cost of application (θ) and 5) the parameters of the distributions of the shocks ( , η, σ).
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In our model the generic R&D equation (1) is a rst-order condition. The model directly suggests how to interpret the parameters and enter the subsidy rate into the estimation equation. The β vector of parameters shifts the quality of the project (α) and the error term is a shock to the quality of the project, observed by the rm, but unobserved to the econometrician, while the additionality parameter δ is related to the measure of the concavity of the gross prot function (γ).
Our theoretical model imposes specic functional forms on the generic R&D equation (1). However, any empirical implementation of equation (1) 13 In addition one should take into account the process whereby the agency grades each application it receives. This grading process is irrelevant for the purposes of this paper and we have therefore for simplicity omitted it (see Takalo, Tanayama, Toivanen, 2011, for details). 
Implications
Our theoretical model is simple, but nonetheless provides a number of implications for the design of R&D support policies and their econometric analysis.
In this paper we focus on analyzing the rationales for subsidy policy and the question of additionality.
Rationales for Subsidy Policy
Public support to private R&D is typically justied by appropriability problems and nancial market frictions. In our model these are captured by the parameters v and ρ that reect R&D spillovers and the cost of external nance.
As equation (14) shows, the optimal unconstrained subsidy rate s * * is an increasing function of the spillover rate v as expected, but a decreasing function of the cost of external nance ρ (recall that g > 1 > γ). The explanation for the latter result comes from equation (7) which shows that the marginal eect of the subsidy rate on the rm's R&D at the intensive margin is decreasing in the cost of external funding (i.e., ∂R * * (s) 2 /∂s∂ρ < 0).
Because R * * (s) is decreasing in ρ and increasing in s, a higher cost of external nance will also lead to a lower optimal subsidy amount s * * R * * (s * * ) at the intensive margin.
At the extensive margin, however, the eect of external nancing cost is the reverse: dierentiation of the optimal constrained subsidy rate s from equation (15)) with respect to ρ reveals a positive relationship.
Our model also suggests that the design of optimal subsidy policy crucially depends on the rms' production technology parameters (α, γ, F ). For example, it can be shown that the optimal unconstrained subsidy rate s * * is an increasing function of γ.
Existence of Additionality
The central object of interest in the literature has been the question of whether or not an R&D support policy leads to additionality. We dene that an increase in a subsidy rate generates additionality if and only if
holds. Here s 0 and s 1 are the pre-increase and post-increase subsidy rates with s 1 > s 0 , and R(s 0 ) and R (s 1 ) are the corresponding levels of R&D investment. On the left-hand side of condition (24) we have an increase in private R&D generated by the increased subsidy rate. On the right-hand side we have the ensuing increase in the monetary amount of government support.
We immediately observe that there is no additionality unless the rm invests in R&D at least when obtaining s 1 . In what follows we assume that this is the case. It is then clear that there is always additionality at the extensive margin as then R(s 0 ) = 0 and R (s 1 ) > 0 by denition. The size of the average additionality eect at the extensive margin depends on how many rms are able to launch an R&D project because they receive a subsidy.
We then use our model to evaluate the existence of additionality at the intensive margin. For brevity, we consider a marginal increase in the subsidy rate. Let ∆s := s 1 − s 0 and rewrite condition (24) as
Dividing both sides of the inequality by ∆s, then letting ∆s → 0 and using the denition of the derivative yields
Substituting R * * (s) and dR * * /ds from equation (7) for R and R (s) in the inequality and then simplifying gives
where the superscript A stands for additionality. Equation (25) gives the necessary and sucient condition for the existence of additionality at the intensive margin in our model. It shows that the rm's gross prot function cannot be too concave for there to be additionality: a necessary condition for additionality is that γ is non-negative. For example, if prots are logarithmic in R&D (i.e., γ = 0) and there is a positive cost of nance (i.e., ρ > 1), there is necessarily some crowding out.
Condition (25) also shows that the threshold degree of concavity for additionality is an increasing function of the (endogenous) subsidy rate. In case rms get maximum subsidies (and s would bes in equation (25)), we immediately observe that a higher (maximum) subsidy rate is less likely to generate additionality. An analogous conclusion holds for the optimal unconstrained subsidy rate: substituting s * * from equation (14) for s in condition (25) and simplifying yields
Because s * * is increasing in the spillover rate v, additionality becomes less likely with higher spillovers.
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The results arise because there are necessarily decreasing returns to R&D for a rm at the intensive margin: When the agency increases the subsidy rate to induce the rm to invest more (e.g. because v is large), the increase in R&D 14 If v is large enough, the subsidy rate is given by s, and condition (25) applies.
is smaller for every further increase of the subsidy rate (i.e., ∂R * * (s) 2 /∂s 2 < 0) .
Interpretation of Additionality Parameters
The standard approach of measuring additionality usually results in an estimated additionality parameter, or as, e.g., in Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2012), a few additionality parameters, that are conditioned on an observable measure of rm type. Our model provides several new insights into the interpretation of the additionality parameters reported in the literature.
First, the response to a support decision at both the intensive and the extensive margin depends on the R&D production technology and is therefore heterogeneous if rms have dierent production technologies. Second, whenever a dummy variable for receiving a subsidy is used in estimations, the reaction of corporate R&D to the level of support cannot be separated from its reaction to getting (versus not getting) support. Such separation would however be desirable since the additionality eects of subsidies may be dierent at the intensive and at the extensive margin. Further, if the treatment eects at the two margins are not separated, the estimated additionality parameters are some weighted average over those rms treated at the extensive margin and those treated at the intensive margin. While such an average parameter is certainly informative, it is may be vulnerable to misinterpretation, e.g., when a large fraction of rms is at the extensive margin.
Finally, the interest in additionality arises from the idea that additionality is at least a necessary, if not a sucient, condition for a welfare-improving subsidy policy. Our model however shows that those projects that generate higher spillovers (and therefore receive higher subsidy rates) are less likely to exhibit additionality at the intensive margin than projects generating smaller spillovers. This suggests that the relation between additionality and welfare may not be clear cut.
To study the issue further we characterize the conditions when a marginal increase in a subsidy rate increases welfare at the intensive margin in our model, and relate this to the conditions for the existence of additionality established in the previous subsection. The way to do this in our modeling framework is to reinterpret equation (11) as the social welfare function, and to assume that the agency is not maximizing this objective function because of divergent objectives (e.g. career objectives of the civil servants). A straightforward derivation of the function (11) with respect to s using the envelope theorem and equations (6) and (7) as in Section 2.4. reveals that
where the superscript W stands for a welfare improvement.
According to our model, nding additionality from a marginal increase in a subsidy rate is a necessary condition for a welfare improvement if γ A ≤ γ W .
Using equations (25) and (27) 
Equation (28) shows that establishing whether or not additionality is a sucient (but not a necessary) or a necessary (but not a sucient) condition for a welfare improvement at the intensive margin requires knowledge of project level structural parameters.
The conclusion does not change even if we consider a welfare maximizing agency. Then the agency increases the subsidy rate if this is optimal.
However, our results in the previous subsection suggest that such an increase does not need to lead to additionality: since the agency benets at the margin more from R&D than the rm if there are positive spillovers, it may be willing to encourage the rm to invest more even if there were some crowding out. Thus it might be possible that no evidence for additionality can be found in a country where R&D projects create large spillovers (and where the support is therefore optimally extensive), while additionality is found in a country with small spillovers (and small subsidies) but otherwise the same R&D production technology.
Conclusions
Explicit modeling of R&D support policies has potential advantages in empirical work: it makes the mechanisms aecting the dependent variables clear, helps in uncovering the critical assumptions for identication of the model, and allows for identication of a number of objects of policy interest that might otherwise remain elusive. Our results in this paper also throw light on the alleged rationales for innovation support policies, and suggest that they do not always provide a foundation for more extensive government interven-30 tion: We nd that in our model higher costs of external nance provide a reason to increase subsidies at the extensive margin but, contrary to what is often thought, suggest a reason to decrease subsidies at the intensive margin.
We also show that the degree of additionality is most likely rm-or even project-specic and depends on the production technology parameters. Further, the degree of additionality at the intensive margin inversely depends on the spillover rate. Therefore, additionality may not be observed for those projects which generate the largest benets from public support. This suggests caution in interpreting the estimated additionality parameters in the received literature in terms of welfare eects of the existing policy. by equation (7) is well-behaving since
is negative (recall that γ < 1 by Assumption 1). By implication, the rm is able raise external funding in stage three according to the terms given by equation (5), i.e., π B * (s) = ρ (R * * (s) + F ) − sR * * (s) for all v and d.
In stage two, the agency chooses s ∈ [0,s] to maximize U (R * * (s), s) conditional on its v and d = 1. We want to prove that for each v ∈ V, there is a unique optimal subsidy rate s * (v). Since U (R * * (s), s) is continuous and we have linear constraints of minimum and maximum subsidies it suce to show that U (R * * (s), s) is concave when evaluated at the interior solution, s = s * * , i.e., we want to show that d 2 U (R * * (s), s)/ds 2 | s=s * * < 0.
Note rst from equation (7) that
and
